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ABSTRACT: One of the most visible consumer protections in the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act is the requirement that health insurers pay out at least 80 percent to 85 
percent of premium dollars for medical care expenses. Insurers that pay out less than this 
minimum “medical loss ratio” (MLR) must rebate the difference to their policyholders, 
starting in 2011. Using insurers’ MLR data from 2010, this issue brief estimates the rebates 
expected in each state if the new rules had been in effect a year earlier. Nationally, con-
sumers would have received almost $2 billion of rebates if the new MLR rules had been in 
effect in 2010. Almost $1 billion would be in the individual market, where rebates would 
go to 5.3 million people nationally. Another $1 billion would go to policies covering about 
10 million people in the small- and large-group markets.
            
OVERVIEW
One of the most visible consumer protections in the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act is the regulation of health insurers’ “medical loss ratios” 
(MLRs). The MLR is a key financial measure that shows the percentage of pre-
mium dollars a health insurer pays out for medical care expenses, as opposed to 
the portion kept for profits, overhead, and sales expenses.1
The Affordable Care Act sets minimum MLRs for insurers to reduce 
administrative costs and thus the ultimate cost of insurance to consumers and 
the government. Insurers offering comprehensive major medical policies must 
maintain an MLR of at least 80 percent in the individual and small-group markets 
and 85 percent in the large-group market.2 Insurance companies that pay out less 
than these percentages on medical care and health care quality improvement must 
rebate the difference to their policyholders.
The new MLR regulations took effect January 1, 2011, and consumers 
will receive their first rebates in the summer of 2012 from health insurers that fail 
to meet the requirements. This issue brief uses insurers’ data from 2010 to make 
rough projections about the impact of the MLR rules by estimating the rebates 
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that would have been expected if the new MLR rules 
had been in effect a year earlier. These “what if” esti-
mates provide a rough prediction of the impact the 
MLR rules may have in their first year of application—
either by way of requiring rebates or by motivating 
insurers to reduce rates in order to avoid rebates.
This issue brief first describes the sampling 
process to determine which insurers offering health 
insurance policies are projected to owe a rebate and 
discusses how the rebates are estimated. Next, it pres-
ents estimated rebates by state, market segment, and 
insurer characteristics (e.g. publicly traded vs. nonpub-
licly traded, nonprofit vs. for-profit, and provider-spon-
sored vs. non–provider-sponsored). Finally, it discusses 
the implications and limitations of these findings.
HOW THIS STUDY WAS CONDUCTED
Insurer Sample Selection
We included both health and life insurers that offer com-
prehensive medical coverage and filed their annual finan-
cial reports using the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners’ (NAIC) Supplemental Health Care 
Exhibit (SHCE).3 Under the Affordable Care Act, mul-
tistate insurers are required to complete the SHCE form 
for each state in which they have a corporate subsidiary. 
Thus, our initial sample included 2,633 state insurers that 
offer comprehensive health insurance as either health 
or life insurers. The number of members covered by 
individual, small-group, and large-group policies were 
10.1 million, 17.9 million, and 39.6 million, respectively. 
We excluded property and casualty and fraternal insurers 
unless they filed as a health insurer.4,5 Since insurers with 
enrollment of fewer than 1,000 members have less actu-
arial “credibility,”—meaning they face greater variabil-
ity of medical utilization and costs—these insurers are 
exempted from the MLR rebate regulation.6 As a result, 
our reduced sample included the 985 “credible” insurers 
that covered an average of at least 1,000 members during 
the calendar year.7
Insurers typically have multiple corporate 
entities within a given state, for different products 
lines—health maintenance organization (HMO) vs. 
preferred provider organization (PPO), for example—
and for affiliates created or acquired at different 
times. Therefore, we further aggregated the corporate 
subsidiaries within each state that belong to a single 
insurance group.8 On the basis of corporate affiliation 
within each state, the total sample size was 648 “cred-
ible” insurers who would be subject to the MLR rules 
(i.e. they averaged at least 1,000 members over the 
year) if the rules were in effect in 2010. These include 
406 insurers offering individual coverage, 396 offer-
ing small-group policies, and 421 offering large-group 
insurance (Exhibit 1). These credible insurers covered 
about 9.8 million people through individual policies, 
17.8 million through small-group policies, and 39.5 
million through large-group insurance.
Exhibit 1. Number of Insurers by Market Segment



















Only individual 918 78
Only small-group 72 8
Only large-group 70 24
Only individual and small-group 156 72 156 20
Only individual and large-group 104 10 104 46
Only small- and large-group 77 50 77 48
Individual, small- and large-group 387 246 387 318 387 303
Total 1,565 406 692 396 638 421
* Credible means insurer covers on average at least 1,000 members during the calendar year of 2010 and so would be subject to MLR regulation. Credible 
insurers operating in more than one market segment may not have credible blocks of business in all market segments. Shown here are insurers with more 
than 1,000 members in at least one (but not necessarily every) market segment in which they do business.
Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Measuring Medical Loss Ratios
The Affordable Care Act requires health insurers to pay 
a rebate to consumers if they do not comply with the 
minimum medical loss ratio (MLR) of 80 percent for 
individual and small-group policies and 85 percent for 
large-group policies. The law defines small employers 
as those with 100 or fewer employees, but since many 
states currently define a small employer as having 50 
or fewer employees, states are allowed to maintain 
that definition until 2016. Medical loss ratios can be 
calculated in a variety of ways, depending on how 
the numerator of medical claims and the denominator 
of total premiums are defined. The Affordable Care 
Act’s rules differ from standard financial ratios in two 
important ways. First, the MLR numerator for medi-
cal claims includes the cost of quality improvement 
activities and fraud and abuse detection and recovery 
expenses. Second, the denominator for total premiums 
subtracts federal and state taxes and assessments. Both 
these adjustments result in a higher MLR than a stan-
dard financial report, which makes it easier for insurers 
to meet the minimum MLR requirements.
Full calculation of MLR rebates requires sev-
eral additional adjustments. The first is a “credibility” 
adjustment based on average membership, to reflect 
the fact that insurers with smaller enrollments face 
greater variability of medical utilization and costs. 
Insurers with fewer than 75,000 members receive a 
sliding-scale adjustment ranging from 8.3 percent for 
1,000 members to no adjustment for 75,000 or more 
members. Those with fewer than 1,000 members 
are exempt from the MLR requirement entirely. We 
make this adjustment using available data but are not 
able to make two other allowed adjustments: one for 
high-deductible insurance,9 and another for amounts 
that insurers retain to pay claims filed after year-end 
for medical care delivered during the current year.10 
Despite the limitations, our aggregate findings are 
broadly consistent with those from other analysts.11
For 2011 through 2013, the MLR regula-
tion also allows states to request a waiver from the 
Department of Health and Human Services for individ-
ual health insurance only. To receive this waiver, states 
must show that complying with the 80 percent MLR 
would force too many insurers to exit the individual 
market and leave members with too few insurance 
options. Seven states have been granted a waiver out of 
the 17 that applied, with allowable MLRs ranging from 
65 percent to 75 percent (Exhibit 2b below). We use 
these waivered levels to calculate the expected rebates 
in those particular states.
ESTIMATING MEDICAL LOSS RATIOS, BY 
STATE AND MARKET SEGMENT
Rebates for Individual Coverage
Exhibit 2a shows the number and percentage of insur-
ers per state that would owe a rebate for individual 
coverage if the MLR rules had been in effect in 2010. 
The exhibit also indicates the total rebate per state 
(with top five states bolded), and the estimated median 
rebate per member among insurers that owe any 
rebate.12 For states that have received a waiver, Exhibit 
2b shows the reduced minimum MLR and what the 
median rebates would have been without a waiver.
Nationally, we estimate that insurance con-
sumers in the individual market would have received 
almost a billion dollars in rebates for 2010 if the new 
MLR rules had been in effect then. Rebates would go 
out to 5.3 million of the 10.1 million people covered by 
this type of insurance, which is 53 percent of the indi-
vidual market nationally.
At a state level, total estimated rebates would 
be the highest for Texas and Florida, with $172 mil-
lion and $109 million in rebates, respectively. Fifteen 
insurers in Texas and 10 in Florida would owe a 
rebate in the individual market. The next three states 
with the highest estimated total rebates are: Illinois 
($67 million), Virginia ($50 million), and Missouri 
($43 million). Eleven states have at least eight 
insurers that would pay a rebate (Arizona, Florida, 
Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas). 
Among these states, the highest rebate per member is 
North Carolina with $285 and the lowest is Florida 
with $145 per member.
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Exhibit 2a. Estimated Individual Coverage Rebates and Market Share by State, 2010
State
Number of insurers 
owing a rebate
Market share of  
insurers owing a rebate
Estimated  
total rebate
Annual rebate  
per member
AK 1 8% $482,171 $368
AL 5 9% $4,478,261 $278
AR 5 89% $8,565,831 $81
AZ 10 95% $37,263,440 $153
CA** 3 31% $36,404,709 $123
CO 7 37% $24,384,475 $219
CT 5 42% $13,519,939 $296
DC 2 22% $487,761 $111
DE 2 33% $1,387,174 $228 
FL 10 88% $108,879,716 $145
GA* 11 45% $37,110,259 $233
HI 0 0% $0 $0
IA* 5 13% $4,682,827 $207
ID 4 53% $3,943,771 $58
IL 12 92% $67,205,184 $159
IN 6 92% $24,514,821 $148
KS 6 45% $10,182,059 $180
KY* 4 98% $8,385,536 $58
LA 5 17% $9,018,369 $321
MA 2 5% $3,139,868 $603
MD 5 22% $14,981,817 $359
ME* 1 34% $5,436,001 $425
MI 9 31% $24,425,945 $239
MN 2 12% $7,906,157 $266
MO 10 88% $42,999,105 $203
MS 6 79% $8,416,768 $134
MT 4 40% $6,403,902 $304
NC* 8 15% $18,144,,817 $285
ND 1 12% $1,390,628 $283
NE 4 27% $5,460,006 $185
NH* 4 94% $7,011,095 $217
NJ 1 4% $749,781 $151
NM 2 4% $1,045,584 $439
NV* 6 94% $11,385,107 $139
NY 1 3% $2,192,486 $661
OH 6 74% $39,240,643 $263
OK 6 89% $16,038,939 $149
OR 3 14% $7,811,583 $298
PA 10 34% $31,131,338 $195
RI 0 0% $0 $0
SC 8 82% $34,089,117 $311
SD 1 4% $156,414 $69
TN 8 64% $25,337,381 $169
TX 15 93% $171,965,247 $251
UT 7 36% $4,156,869 $81
VA 7 88% $50,525,971 $181
VT 0 0% $0 $0
WA 3 33% $6,504,757 $62
WI 5 40% $10,326,494 $148
WV 4 80% $4,373,491 $251
WY 2 27% $1,429,844 $217
US***  53% $965,073,457 $183
Bolding indicates the five states with the highest total rebate amounts.
* Approved waiver states. ** California data are incomplete. *** Insurers total estimated rebate value is a sum value; rebate per member is total rebates divided by rebate 
members; market-share percentage is total insured members divided by total insured members receiving a rebate.
Source: Authors’ analysis and Center for Consumer Information & Insurance Oversight, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
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No insurers in Hawaii, Rhode Island, or 
Vermont would have been expected to pay a rebate if the 
new MLR rules had been in effect in 2010. In Idaho and 
Kentucky, individual insurers owing a rebate would have 
had the lowest rebates of $58 per member. It is notable 
that Maine would have made one of the highest rebate 
amounts of $425 per member even though it received 
a waiver to phase in its MLR at a rate of 65 percent in 
the first year. Without the waiver, the median rebate in 
Maine would have increased to $500 (Exhibit 2b).13
In Kentucky, New Hampshire, and West 
Virginia, only four insurers offering individual insur-
ance policy would have been expected to pay a rebate. 
Although these individual insurers represent only 15 
percent of Kentucky’s insurers, 20 percent of New 
Hampshire’s insurers, and 14 percent of West Virginia’s 
insurers (data not shown), these four insurers control 
98 percent, 94 percent, and 80 percent of their respec-
tive state’s individual market share. It is also important 
to note that both Kentucky and New Hampshire have 
received a waiver. Kentucky’s revised MLR standard 
of 75 percent reduces its estimated 2010 rebate per 
member from $61 to $58. New Hampshire’s revised 
MLR standard of 72 percent reduces its estimated 2010 
rebate per member from $235 to $217 (Exhibit 2b).
Rebates for Small-Group Coverage
Exhibit 3 presents estimates of rebates that insurers 
would be expected to pay for small-group insurance 
(i.e., employers with 50 or fewer workers), if the new 
MLR rules had been in effect in 2010. Nationally, small-
group insurers would have paid almost a half billion 
dollars in rebates to 4.3 million small-group members, 
representing 24 percent of that market segment.
Virginia would have six insurers owing a total 
of $57 million in rebates and Florida would have four 
insurers owing $50 million. The next three states with 
the highest estimated total annual rebates (shown in 
bold) are: Texas ($43 million), Illinois ($41 million), 
and Maryland ($38 million). Rebates per member 
would exceed $300 in California, the District of 
Columbia, and New Jersey, with the highest rebates 
estimated for California ($489) and New Jersey 
($459). Small-group insurers in 11 states would not 
have owed any rebate; 17 states would have an esti-
mated rebate per member of less than $100.
In Arizona, Hawaii, and Maryland, at least 40 
percent of the small-group insurers would be expected 
to pay a rebate (data not shown), representing from 18 
percent (Hawaii) to 73 percent (Arizona) of the market. 
Insurers covering at least half of the small-group mar-
ket share would owe rebates in nine states (Arizona, 
Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin).
Rebates for Large-Group Coverage
Exhibit 4 presents estimated rebates that insurers 
would pay for large-group insurance if the new MLR 
rules had been in effect in 2010. In the aggregate, 
large-group consumers would have received almost 
a half billion dollars in rebates—to 5.9 million mem-
bers, or 15 percent of that market segment.14 Large-
group consumers in Maryland, Florida, and Texas 
would have received estimated annual rebates in 
excess of $40 million, while California and New York 
would receive estimated annual rebates of around $38 
million. Rebates per member would have exceeded 
$300 in Michigan and New Hampshire. Large-group 
Exhibit 2b. Revised Individual Coverage Rebates in Waiver States
Waiver states
Annual rebate per member 
assuming 80 percent MLR
MLR waiver percentage  
in 2011
Revised annual rebate  
per member
GA $258 70% $233
IA $238 67% $207
KY $61 75% $58
ME $500 65% $425
NC $300 75% $285
NH $235 72% $217
NV $146 75% $139
Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Exhibit 3. Estimated Small-Group Coverage Rebates and Market Share by State, 2010
State
Number of insurers 
owing a rebate
Market share of  
insurers owing a rebate
Estimated  
total rebate
Annual rebate  
per member
AK 0 0% $0 $0
AL 0 0% $0 $0
AR 2 40% $2,933,712 $57
AZ 8 73% $21,096,518 $93
CA 2 1% $2,646,630 $489
CO 2 12% $10,258,092 $290
CT 2 18% $4,728,265 $85
DC 3 33% $14,475,203 $354
DE 2 28% $2,192,899 $141
FL 4 74% $50,096,511 $76
GA 7 49% $20,195,670 $77
HI 3 18% $3,374,091 $100
IA 1 10% $552,383 $28
ID 0 0% $0 $0
IL 9 28% $41,330,764 $203
IN 7 61% $12,797,808 $71
KS 5 15% $5,963,792 $165
KY 0 0% $0 $0
LA 1 2% $297,493 $39
MA 2 3% $4,172,981 $226
MD 3 62% $38,838,833 $151
ME 1 2% $40,837 $26
MI 4 5% $5,475,469 $210
MN 0 0% $0 $0
MO 7 75% $31,445,646 $103
MS 1 5% $919,113 $139
MT 3 17% $2,087,163 $211
NC 5 9% $3,502,739 $92
ND 0 0% $0 $0
NE 5 44% $9,133,135 $216
NH 1 1% $286,532 $231
NJ 1 0.3% $1,398,518 $459
NM 3 11% $2,058,046 $224
NV 4 45% $8,933,902 $153
NY 2 2% $3,763,205 $123
OH 6 20% $12,333,990 $78
OK 5 63% $20,852,496 $168
OR 1 4% $49,342 $5
PA 3 25% $5,664,244 $21
RI 0 0% $0 $0
SC 3 57% $3,911,090 $35
SD 0 0% $0 $0
TN 4 19% $8,217,820 $103
TX 10 27% $43,160,221 $136
UT 3 35% $3,559,213 $48
VA 6 59% $57,251,964 $189
VT 0 0% $0 $0
WA 0 0% $0 $0
WI 4 51% $11,184,352 $63
WV 1 34% $1,512,451 $64
WY 0 0% $0 $0
US 24% $472,693,133 $85
Bolding indicates the five states with the highest total rebate amounts.
* California data are incomplete. ** Insurers total estimated rebate value is a sum value; rebate per member is total rebates divided by rebate members; market-share percentage 
is total insured members divided by total insured members receiving a rebate.
Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Exhibit 4. Estimated Large-Group Coverage Rebates and Market Share by State, 2010
State
Number of insurers  
owing a rebate
Market share of  
insurers owing a rebate
Estimated  
total rebate
 Annual rebate  
per member
AK 0 0% $0 $0
AL 2 5% $5,466,934 $218
AR 1 8% $2,971,794 $161
AZ 5 15% $10,745,893 $154
CA 6 44% $39,135,237 $94
CO 3 2% $3,448,936 $276
CT 4 28% $6,221,888 $40
DC 5 26% $34,711,861 $260
DE 3 13% $517,190 $37
FL 4 17% $42,789,749 $128
GA 7 18% $16,981,710 $89
HI 1 2% $1,205,585 $168
IA 0 0% $0 $0
ID 1 1% $164,749 $63
IL 6 2% $3,584,636 $72
IN 1 3% $1,818,242 $111
KS 1 1% $87,899 $19
KY 3 65% $11,464,698 $43
LA 1 0.40% $81,048 $81
MA 3 1% $2,983,405 $152
MD 6 20% $55,509,115 $231
ME 1 4% $450,857 $58
MI 2 1% $5,112,485 $315
MN 1 0.40% $319,334 $124
MO 3 11% $7,756,319 $112
MS 2 13% $2,120,132 $0
MT 0 0% $0 $95
NC 4 12% $11,136,690 $166
ND 1 2% $390,156 $131
NE 2 10% $1,837,553 $82
NH 1 1% $629,610 $375
NJ 5 19% $27,427,485 $116
NM 0 0% $0 $0
NV 2 58% $21,646,775 $94
NY 7 15% $38,119,610 $44
OH 1 36% $24,768,128 $48
OK 1 2% $233,112 $32
OR 0 0% $0 $0
PA 6 24% $35,705,528 $57
RI 1 5% $180,950 $19
SC 1 0% $176,325 $176
SD 0 0% $0 $0
TN 4 28% $9,366,399 $67
TX 7 27% $40,213,023 $68
UT 1 17% $277,337 $3
VA 6 15% $20,653,608 $112
VT 1 12% $395,816 $42
WA 1 1% $295,954 $20
WI 1 15% $6,198,204 $38
WV 1 5% $486,170 $66
WY 0 0% $0 $0
US**  15% $495,788,128 $72 
Bolding indicates the five states with the highest total rebate amounts.
* California data are incomplete. ** Insurers total estimated rebate value is a sum value; rebate per member is total rebates divided by rebate members; market-share percentage 
is total insured members divided by total insured members receiving a rebate.
Source: Authors’ analysis.
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insurers in Alaska, Iowa, Montana, New Mexico, 
Oregon, South Dakota, and Wyoming would not have 
incurred any rebate. In Connecticut, the District of 
Columbia, Maryland, and New Jersey, more than half 
of the large-group insurers would pay a rebate (data 
not shown). In Kentucky and Nevada, large-group 
insurers that would owe rebates have more than 50 
percent of the market share; those in eight other states 
(California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, 
Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas) 
that would owe rebates cover 20 percent or more of 
the market.
Rebate Estimates by Insurer 
Characteristics
Exhibit 5 presents the percentage of credible insur-
ers that would be expected to pay a rebate by various 
insurer characteristics, as well as their median rebate 
per member.15 In this exhibit, we treat each corpo-
rate entity within a state as a separate insurer—rather 
than aggregating affiliated subsidiaries into a single 
insurer—to generate more observations about how 
each type of corporate entity is managed.
If the new MLR rules were in effect for 2010, 
insurers that are privately-owned, nonprofit, and 
provider-sponsored would be substantially less likely 
than their corporate counterparts to owe rebates in each 
of the market segments. For some market segments, 
there are large differences in the likelihood of owing a 
rebate. Provider-sponsored health plans show the most 
pronounced difference, perhaps because they are more 
inclined to favor provider reimbursement over corpo-
rate profits. A consistent pattern did not emerge, how-
ever, for median rebate amounts among insurers owing 
any rebate.16
Overall Market in Each State
Exhibit 6 presents estimates for each state across the 
three market segments combined. In 26 states, at least 
20 percent of commercial health insurance consumers 
would have received rebates for 2010 if the new MLR 
rules had been in effect that year. Rebates would go 
to almost half the market or more in Arizona, Florida, 
Kentucky, Missouri, and Nevada. Overall, in 19 states, 
nine or more insurers would owe rebates in at least  
part of the market, with Texas topping the list with  
22 rebate insurers.
Exhibit 5. Estimated Annual Rebates by Insurer Characteristics, 2010
Credible* insurers  
owing a rebate
Median rebate  
per member
Individual coverage
Publicly traded (n=266) 70%**  $217**
Nonpublicly traded (n=263) 48% $334 
For-profit (n=411) 70%**  $237**
Nonprofit (n=118) 20% $107
Non–provider-sponsored (n=499) 61%** $230 
Provider-sponsored (n=30) 23% $174 
Small-group coverage
Publicly traded (n=292) 37%** $108 
Nonpublicly traded (n=275) 22% $138 
For-profit (n=379) 39%**  $126 
Nonprofit (n=188) 12% $78 
Non–provider-sponsored (n=500) 33%**  $119 
Provider-sponsored (n=67) 8%  $92
Large-group coverage
Publicly traded (n=357) 28%**  $93***
Nonpublicly traded (n=275) 16% $162
For-profit (n=420) 29%**  $101
Nonprofit (n=212) 10% $117
Non–provider-sponsored (n=559) 25%** $101
Provider-sponsored (n=73) 5% $116
* Credible means insurer covers on average at least 1,000 members during the calendar year of 2010 and so would be subject to MLR regulation.
** = significant at .01 level. ***= significant at .05 level.
Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Exhibit 6. Estimated Market Share and Total Annual Rebate for Insurers Owing Rebate
State
Number of insurers  
owing a rebate
Overall % market  
receiving rebate
Total estimated  
annual rebate
AK 1 1% $482,171 
AL 6 4% $9,945,195
AR 5 37% $14,471,337
AZ 13 52% $69,105,851
CA* 8 27% $78,186,576
CO 9 12% $38,091,504
CT 7 26% $24,470,092
DC 5 27% $49,674,824
DE 5 20% $4,097,263
FL 11 47% $201,765,976
GA* 15 32% $74,287,639
HI 3 6% $4,579,677
IA* 6 6% $5,235,210
ID 5 15% $4,108,520
IL 17 21% $112,120,583
IN 10 37% $39,130,871
KS 9 11% $16,233,750
KY* 4 55% $19,850,234
LA 6 5% $9,396,910
MA 6 2% $10,296,254
MD 9 30% $109,329,765
ME* 2 7% $5,927,694
MI 12 5% $35,013,899
MN 3 3% $8,225,491
MO 13 45% $82,201,070
MS 7 24% $11,456,013
MT 6 15% $8,491,065
NC 12 12% $ 32,784,247
ND 2 3% $1,780,784
NE 7 22% $16,430,694
NH* 5 12% $7,927,237
NJ 6 11% $29,575,784
NM 5 4% $3,103,630
NV* 8 61% $41,965,783
NY 7 12% $44,075,301
OH 11 34% $76,342,761
OK 10 32% $37,124,548
OR 4 3% $7,860,925
PA 15 25% $72,501,110
RI 1 3% $180,950
SC 11 33% $38,176,531
SD 1 1% $156,414
TN 11 32% $42,921,600
TX 22 39% $255,338,491
UT 9 24% $7,993,419
VA 12 37% $128,431,543
VT 1 6% $395,816
WA 4 6% $6,800,711
WI 6 26% $27,709,050
WV 5 21% $6,372,111
WY 2  7% $1,429,844
US 23% $1,933,072,547
Bolding indicates the five states with the highest total rebate amounts.
* California data are incomplete.
Source: Authors’ analysis.
10 THe coMMonwealTH Fund
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
The new limits on insurers’ medical loss ratios in the 
Affordable Care Act are intended to reduce overhead 
costs and consequently, the overall costs of health 
insurance. If the new MLR rules had been effect in 
2010, we estimate that insurance consumers would 
have received close to $2 billion in rebates. These 
would be spread across 53 percent of the members 
in the individual market, but only 24 percent and 15 
percent of the small- and large-group markets, respec-
tively. This indicates that the new rules have been 
designed in a way that does not place onerous restric-
tions on the market as a whole. The law’s minimum 
MLRs were keyed to existing market averages. In 
addition, the definition of MLR in the law is somewhat 
more forgiving than prevailing reporting practices. 
Further, seven states (out of the 17 that applied) have 
been granted waivers that reduce the target MLRs in 
their individual markets.
As expected, a greater proportion of consum-
ers in the individual market would expect rebates 
than would those in the group markets. This reflects 
the fact that the individual market is held to the same 
minimum loss ratio as is the small-group market, even 
though loss ratios in the individual market histori-
cally are lower,17 due in part to higher average sales 
costs. For consumers who receive rebates, the aver-
age amounts could be substantial—often in the $100 
to $300 range per person, and occasionally more. 
Insurers in Texas and Florida are expected to pay over 
$200 million in rebates in each state, across all three 
policy types.
Also as expected, a significantly greater pro-
portion of for-profit and publicly traded insurers would 
owe rebates compared with nonprofit insurers, if the 
MLR rules had applied in 2010. Notably, few provider-
sponsored insurers would owe any rebates, perhaps 
reflecting their institutional incentive to favor medical 
claims over corporate profits.
Insurers have had advance notice of the new 
MLR rules for a year and are expected to change in 
various ways in anticipation of their effect.18 Some 
insurers may reduce their overhead and premiums or 
increase costs related to improving quality of care to be 
sure they conform to the MLR minimums. However, 
others may seek to maximize profits by ensuring that 
their MLRs do not rise higher than the minimums 
set by the Affordable Care Act. Moreover, profits are 
affected both by the MLR and by how much insurance 
a company sells. To attract more subscribers, pressure 
on the MLR can thus translate into reduced premiums 
through reduced medical costs. Regardless of which 
of these speculative possibilities transpire, it is almost 
certain that the MLR rules will produce different 
results in future years than are estimated here for 2010. 
However, even if rebates dwindle, this analysis indi-
cates that millions of consumers stand to benefit from 
the new rule’s reduction of profits and overhead costs 
incurred by many insurers.
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